Climate policies can be applied either upstream, where fossil fuels are extracted, or downstream, where emissions are generated. Specific policy instruments can be defined for either level, and can take the form of a price signal such as through a tax, or a quantity limit such as through direct regulation or a permit market. In this study, we present an agent-based model to compare the performance of these different instruments and regulation levels. Since policy coverage is often limited, i.e. not all firms being under the regulator’s control, we also examine the impact of incomplete coverage on relative policy performance. Our analysis shows that only upstream regulation leads to an increase in fossil fuel prices, which is benefitial under limited coverage as it also affects firms not directly affected by the policy instruments; that prices under quantity-based regulation can decline after an initial peak, stabilizing at a lower level than under the tax; and that direct regulation is more efficient when applied upstream.
EPOC Working Paper No. 05 / Work Package 02
2023 / Rosa van den Ende, Antoine Mandel, Agnieszka Rusinowska
Network-based allocation of responsibility for GHG-emissions
The extent to which adopting energy-efficient technologies results in energy savings depends on how such technologies are used, and how monetary savings from energy efficiency are spent. Energy rebound occurs when potential energy savings are diminished due to post-adoption behaviour. Here we review empirical studies on how six behavioural regularities affect three energy-relevant decisions and ultimately rebound: adoption of energy-saving products or practices, their intensity of use and spending of associated monetary savings. The findings suggest that behaviours that reflect limited rationality and willpower may increase rebound, while the effects of behaviours driven by bounded self-interest are less clear. We then describe how interventions associated with each of the behavioural regularities can influence rebound and thus serve to achieve higher energy savings. Future research ought to study energy-relevant decisions in a more integrated manner, with a particular focus on re-spending as this presents the greatest challenge for research and policy.
We assess evidence from theoretical-modelling, empirical and experimental studies on how interactions between instruments of climate policy affect overall emissions reduction. Such interactions take the form of negative, zero or positive synergistic effects. The considered instruments comprise performance and technical standards, carbon pricing, adoption subsidies, innovation support, and information provision. Based on the findings, we formulate climate-policy packages that avoid negative and employ positive synergies, and compare their strengths and weaknesses on other criteria. We note that the international context of climate policy has been neglected in assessments of policy mixes, and argue that transparency and harmonization of national policies may be key to a politically feasible path to meet global emission targets. This suggests limiting the complexity of climate-policy packages.
EPOC Working Paper No. 03 / Work Package 02
2023 / Daniel Torren Peraire, Ivan Savin, Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh
An agent-based model of cultural change for a low-carbon transition
A price on emissions can be achieved through an emission tax or permit trading. The advantages and drawbacks of either instrument are debated. We present an agent-based model to compare their performance under bounded rationality and dynamic markets. It describes firms that face uncertainty about future demand and prices; use heuristic rules to decide production levels, trading prices, and technology adoption; and are heterogeneous in terms of production factors, abatement costs, and trading behavior. Using multiple evaluation criteria and a wide range of parameter values, we find that the main difference between the two policies lies in the fact that permit prices fall after successful abatement. This can lead to higher production levels under permit trading, but can also drive emission-efficient firms out of the market. Scarcity rents under permit trading can further create higher profit rates for firms, the extent of which is shown to depend on the mechanisms for market-clearing and initial allocation.
This survey discusses behavioral and experimental macroeconomics, emphasizing a complex systems perspective. The economy consists of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents who do not fully understand their complex environment and use simple decision heuristics. Central to our survey is the question of under which conditions a complex macro-system of interacting agents may or may not coordinate on the rational equilibrium outcome. A general finding is that under positive expectations feedback (strategic complementarity)—where optimistic (pessimistic) expectations can cause a boom (bust)—coordination failures are quite common. The economy is then rather unstable, and persistent aggregate fluctuations arise strongly amplified by coordination on trend-following behavior leading to (almost-)self-fulfilling equilibria. Heterogeneous expectations and heuristics switching models match this observed micro and macro behavior surprisingly well. We also discuss policy implications of this coordination failure on the perfectly rational aggregate outcome and how policy can help to manage the self-organization process of a complex economic system.(JEL C63, C90, D91, E12, E71, G12)
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